Compromise in combinatorial vote

Hayrullah Dindar and Jean Lainé

Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, vol. 59, issue 1, No 7, 175-206

Abstract: Abstract We consider collective choice problems where the set of social outcomes is a Cartesian product of finitely many finite sets. Each individual is assigned a two-level preference, defined as a pair involving a vector of strict rankings of elements in each of the sets and a strict ranking of social outcomes. A voting rule is called (resp. weakly) product stable at some two-level preference profile if every (resp. at least one) outcome formed by separate coordinate-wise choices is also an outcome of the rule applied to preferences over social outcomes. We investigate the (weak) product stability for the specific class of compromise solutions involving q-approval rules, where q lies between 1 and the number I of voters. Given a finite set $$\mathcal {X}$$ X and a profile of I linear orders over $$\mathcal {X}$$ X , a q-approval rule selects elements of $$\mathcal {X}$$ X that gathers the largest support above q at the highest rank in the profile. Well-known q-approval rules are the Fallback Bargaining solution ( $$q=I$$ q = I ) and the Majoritarian Compromise ( $$q=\left\lceil \frac{I}{2}\right\rceil$$ q = I 2 ). We assume that coordinate-wise rankings and rankings of social outcomes are related in a neutral way, and we investigate the existence of neutral two-level preference domains that ensure the weak product stability of q-approval rules. We show that no such domain exists unless either $$q=I$$ q = I or very special cases prevail. Moreover, we characterize the neutral two-level preference domains over which the Fallback Bargaining solution is weakly product stable.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01387-6

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