Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing

Hayrullah Dindar and Jean Lainé

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 161, issue C, 105-107

Abstract: Manipulation of indirect elections by vote pairing occurs when a group of voters in different electoral bodies secures a jointly preferred winner by performing pairwise exchanges of votes. We show that in elections involving a large enough number of districts, each with a large enough size, no reasonable constitution is immune to vote-pairing.

Keywords: Representative democracy; Vote pairing; Group manipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176517304160
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:161:y:2017:i:c:p:105-107

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.040

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().