Unanimity and the Anscombe’s Paradox
Gilbert Laffond () and
Jean Lainé ()
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Gilbert Laffond: Laboratoire d'Econometrie, LIRSA
No 201301, Working Papers from Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University
We establish a new suffcient condition for avoiding a generalization of the Anscombe’s paradox. In a situation where ballots describe positions regarding ﬁnitely many yes-or-no issues, the Anscombe’s alpha−paradox holds if more than alpha % of the voters disagree with on a majority of issues with the outcome of issue-wise majority voting. We deﬁne the level of unanimity of a set of ballots as the number of issues minus the maximal symmetric diatance between two ballots. We compute for the caseof large electorates, the exact level of unanimity above which the Anscombe’s alpha−paradox never holds, whatever the distribution of votes among ballots.
Keywords: Anscombe; Voting Paradox; Majority Rule; Unamity Issue-wise voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
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http://repeck.bilgi.org.tr/RePEc/msc/wpaper/mscenter_2013_12_AncombesParadox.pdf First version, 2013 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Unanimity and the Anscombe’s paradox (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:msc:wpaper:201301
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