Object Allocation via Immediate-Acceptance: Characterizations and an Affirmative Action Application
Battal Dogan and
Bettina Klaus ()
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie
Which mechanism to use to allocate school seats to students still remains a question of hot debate. Meanwhile, immediate acceptance mechanisms remain popular in many school districts. We formalize desirable properties of mechanisms when respecting the relative rank of a school among the students' preferences is crucial. We show that those properties, together with well-known desirable resource allocation properties, characterize immediate acceptance mechanisms. Moreover, we show that replacing one of the properties, consistency, with a weaker property, non-bossiness, leads to a characterization of a much larger class of mechanisms, which we call choice-based immediate acceptance mechanisms. It turns out that certain objectives that are not achievable with immediate acceptance mechanisms, such as affirmative action, can be achieved with a choice-based immediate acceptance mechanism.
Keywords: affirmative action; consistency; favoring-higher-ranks; immediate acceptance mechanism; non-bossiness; non-wastefulness; rank-respecting unavailable-type-invariance; resource-monotonicity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D61 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:16.15
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