Unified Enrollment in School Choice: How to Improve Student Assignment in Chicago

Battal Dogan and M. Bumin Yenmez

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: The Chicago Board of Education is implementing a centralized clearinghouse to assign students to schools for 2018-19 admissions. In this clearinghouse, each student can simultaneously be admitted to a selective and a nonselective school. We study this divided enrollment system and show that an alternative unified enrollment system, which assigns each student to only one school, is better for all students. We also examine systems with two stages of admissions, which has also been considered in Chicago, and establish conditions under which the unified enrollment system is better than the divided enrollment system.

Keywords: Market design; school choice; unified enrollment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 I21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pp.
Date: 2017-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-edu, nep-gth and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:17.10

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