Perfect and proper equilibria in large games

Xiang Sun and Yishu Zeng

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 119, issue C, 288-308

Abstract: This paper studies pure strategy perfect and proper equilibria for games with non-atomic measure spaces of players and infinitely many actions. A richness condition (nowhere equivalence) on the measure space of players is shown to be both necessary and sufficient for the existence of such equilibria. The limit admissibility of perfect and proper equilibria is also proved.

Keywords: Condition of nowhere equivalence; Large game; Limit admissibility; Perfect equilibrium; Proper equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:119:y:2020:i:c:p:288-308

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.005

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