Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information
Robert Kleinberg and
S. Matthew Weinberg
Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 118, issue C, 511-532
Prophet inequalities have recently become a fundamental tool in the design of sequential and multi-dimensional mechanisms in Bayesian settings. However, existing mechanisms—as well as the underlying prophet inequalities behind their analysis—require sophisticated information about the distribution from which inputs are drawn.
Keywords: Game Theory; Bargaining Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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