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The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching

Samson Alva and Vikram Manjunath

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 119, issue C, 15-29

Abstract: For a model of fractional matching, interpreted as probabilistic matching, together with the allocation of non-negative amounts of money, we show that strategy-proofness, ex post Pareto efficiency of the matching, and a weak version of ex ante individual rationality are incompatible when each agent's utility is a linear function of both their fractional assignment and money. We identify some avenues to escape this impossibility.

Keywords: Fractional; Matching; Strategy-proofness; Pareto efficiency; Individual rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:119:y:2020:i:c:p:15-29

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.009

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