Group targeting under networked synergies

Mohamed Belhaj () and Frédéric Deroïan ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 118, issue C, 29-46

Abstract: A principal targets agents organized in a network of local complementarities, in order to increase the sum of agents' effort. We consider bilateral public contracts à la Segal (1999). The paper shows that the synergies between contracting and non-contracting agents deeply impact optimal contracts: they can lead the principal to contract with a subset of the agents, and to refrain from contracting with central agents.

Keywords: Network; Synergies; Aggregate effort; Optimal group targeting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Group targeting under networked synergies (2019)
Working Paper: Group Targeting under Networked Synergies (2018)
Working Paper: Group Targeting under Networked Synergies (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:29-46

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.003

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