Group targeting under networked synergies

Mohamed Belhaj (mbelhaj@centrale-marseille.fr) and Frédéric Deroïan (frederic.deroian@univ-amu.fr)

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Abstract: A principal targets agents organized in a network of local complementarities, in order to increase the sum of agents' effort. We consider bilateral public contracts à la Segal (1999). The paper shows that the synergies between contracting and non-contracting agents deeply impact optimal contracts: they can lead the principal to contract with a subset of the agents, and to refrain from contracting with central agents.

Keywords: Optimal group targeting; Aggregate effort; Network; Synergies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-02452272v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, 118, pp.29-46. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.003⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Group targeting under networked synergies (2019)
Working Paper: Group Targeting under Networked Synergies (2018)
Working Paper: Group Targeting under Networked Synergies (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02452272

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.003

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