Group Targeting under Networked Synergies
Mohamed Belhaj () and
Frédéric Deroïan ()
Working Papers from HAL
A principal targets agents organized in a network of local complementarities, in order to increase the sum of agents' effort. We consider bilateral public contracts à la Segal (1999). The paper shows that the synergies between contracting and non-contracting agents deeply impact optimal contracts: they can lead the principal to contract with a subset of the agents, and to refrain from contracting with central agents.
Keywords: optimal group targeting; multi-agent contracting; network; synergies; aggregate effort (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Group targeting under networked synergies (2019)
Working Paper: Group targeting under networked synergies (2019)
Working Paper: Group Targeting under Networked Synergies (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01790947
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