Robust group manipulation with indifferences

Steven Kivinen

Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 153, issue C, 554-568

Abstract: We define two belief-free notions of coalitional non-manipulability that rule out coalitions in which some agents are indifferent. Strong robust group strategy-proofness typically yields negative results as it often rules out desirable rules. Semi-strong robust group strategy-proofness permits desirable rules in some environments. The differences between these properties highlight a crucial link between standard truthtelling properties: all members of a successful deviating coalition believe the outcome changes, and indifferent members believe they are essential to implement the change.

Keywords: Robust group strategy-proofness; Voting; Matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D70 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:153:y:2025:i:c:p:554-568

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.001

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