A concavity in the value of information

Mark Whitmeyer

Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 154, issue C, 200-207

Abstract: A natural way of quantifying the “amount of information” in decision problems yields a globally concave value for information. Another (in contrast, adversarial) way almost never does.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:154:y:2025:i:c:p:200-207

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.003

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