Auctions with selective entry

Matthew Gentry, Tong Li and Jingfeng Lu

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 105, issue C, 104-111

Abstract: We consider auctions with entry based on a general analytical framework we call the Arbitrarily Selective (AS) model. We characterize symmetric equilibrium in a broad class of standard auctions within this framework, in the process extending the classic revenue equivalence results of Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Levin and Smith (1994) to environments with endogenous and arbitrarily selective entry. We also explore the relationship between revenue maximization and efficiency, showing that a revenue maximizing seller will typically employ both higher-than-efficient reservation prices and higher-than-efficient entry fees.

Keywords: Auctions; Endogenous participation; Mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:105:y:2017:i:c:p:104-111

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.016

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