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The procedural egalitarian solution

Bas Dietzenbacher, Peter Borm () and Ruud Hendrickx

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 106, issue C, 179-187

Abstract: In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first single-valued solution which coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games and which exists for any TU-game.

Keywords: Egalitarianism; Egalitarian procedure; Procedural egalitarian solution; Egalitarian stability; Constrained equal awards rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Working Paper: The Procedural Egalitarian Solution (2016) Downloads
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