Evaluationwise strategy-proofness

Bora Erdamar, Remzi Sanver and Shin Sato

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 106, issue C, 227-238

Abstract: We consider manipulation of collective decision making rules in a framework where voters not only rank candidates but also evaluate them as “acceptable” or “unacceptable”. In this richer informational setting, we adopt a new notion of strategy-proofness, called evaluationwise strategy-proofness, where incentives of manipulation exist if and only if a voter can replace an outcome which he finds unacceptable with an acceptable one. Evaluationwise strategy-proofness is weaker than strategy-proofness. However, we establish the prevalence of a logical incompatibility between evaluationwise strategy-proofness, anonymity and efficiency. On the other hand, we show possibility results when either anonymity or efficiency is weakened.

Keywords: Approval voting; Efficiency; Evaluationwise strategy-proofness; Preference-approval; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:106:y:2017:i:c:p:227-238

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.010

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