Evaluationwise strategy-proofness

Bora Erdamar, Remzi Sanver and Shin Sato
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Bora Erdamar: University of Rochester [USA]
Shin Sato: University of Fukuoka - University of Fukuoka

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Abstract: We consider manipulation of collective decision making rules in a framework where voters not only rank candidates but also evaluate them as "acceptable" or "unacceptable". In this richer informational setting, we adopt a new notion of strategy-proofness, called evaluationwise strategy-proofness, where incentives of manipulation exist if and only if a voter can replace an outcome which he finds unacceptable with an acceptable one. Evaluationwise strategy-proofness is weaker than strategy-proofness. However, we establish the prevalence of a logical incompatibility between evaluationwise strategy-proofness, anonymity and efficiency. On the other hand, we show possibility results when either anonymity or efficiency is weakened.

Keywords: Approval voting; Efficiency; Evaluationwise strategy-proofness; Preference-approval; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 106, pp.227-238. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.010⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02517255

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.010

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