Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
Tommy Andersson and
Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 107, issue C, 41-59
This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a finite ascending price sequence that terminates to a minimal rationing price equilibrium. This sequence is demonstrated to play a key-role in an Iterative English Auction Rule for housing markets with price restrictions.
Keywords: Rationing price equilibrium; (Extended) English Price Sequences; Iterative English Auction Rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 D45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Sequential Rules for House Allocation with Price Restrictions (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:107:y:2018:i:c:p:41-59
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