Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 107, issue C, 1-20
We study the indivisible object allocation problem without monetary transfer, in which each object is endowed with a weak priority ordering over agents. It is well known that stability is generally not compatible with efficiency. We characterize the priority structures for which a stable and efficient assignment always exists, as well as the priority structures that admit a stable, efficient and (group) strategy-proof rule. While house allocation problems and housing markets are two classic families of allocation problems that admit a stable, efficient and group strategy-proof rule, any priority-augmented allocation problem with more than three objects admits such a rule if and only if it is decomposable into a sequence of subproblems, each of which has the structure of a house allocation problem or a housing market.
Keywords: Indivisible object; Priority; House allocation; Housing market; Stability; Group strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D47 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:107:y:2018:i:c:p:1-20
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