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On the externality-free Shapley–Shubik index

Mikel Álvarez-Mozos, J.M. Alonso-Meijide and M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 105, issue C, 148-154

Abstract: We address the problem of extending the Shapley–Shubik index to the class of simple games with externalities introduced in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017). On the one hand, we provide bounds for any efficient, symmetric, and monotonic power index. On the other hand, we characterize the restriction of the externality-free value of de Clippel and Serrano (2008) to the class of games under study by adapting well-known properties.

Keywords: Externality-free value; Shapley–Shubik index; Partition function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.009

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