Rationalizability and Nash equilibria in guessing games

Christian Seel and Elias Tsakas

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 106, issue C, 75-88

Abstract: Games in which players aim to guess a fraction or multiple p of the average guess are known as guessing games or (p-)beauty contests. In this note, we derive a full characterization of the set of rationalizable strategies and the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria for such games as a function of the parameter p, the number of players and the (discrete) set of available guesses to each player.

Keywords: Guessing game; Beauty contest; Rationalizability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:106:y:2017:i:c:p:75-88

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.013

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