Welfare criteria from choice: An axiomatic analysis

Sean Horan and Yves Sprumont ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 99, issue C, 56-70

Abstract: We propose an axiomatic approach to the problem of deriving a (linear) welfare ordering from a choice function. Admissibility requires that the ordering assigned to a rational choice function is the one that rationalizes it. Neutrality states that the solution covaries with permutations of the alternatives. Persistence stipulates that the ordering assigned to two choice functions is also assigned to every choice function in between.

Keywords: Choice-based welfare analysis; Bounded rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:99:y:2016:i:c:p:56-70

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.005

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