Efficient coalitional bargaining with noncontingent offers

Rakesh Chaturvedi

Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 100, issue C, 125-141

Abstract: A new feature pertaining to proposer's ability to implement offers is introduced in the extensive form bargaining mechanism studied in Okada (1996). This mechanism is used to analyze the coalitional setting of strictly supermodular games. The new feature in the mechanism is that the proposer has a choice to implement his proposal with any subset of responders who have accepted it. Thus the institutional feature of ‘every responder has veto power’ is relaxed here. It is shown that for all sufficiently high discount factors δ, there exists an efficient subgame perfect equilibrium in pure stationary strategies (SSPE) whose limiting outcome is the core-constrained Nash Bargaining Solution. Moreover, all efficient SSPE are payoff-equivalent in the limit as δ→1.

Keywords: Bargaining; Coalitions; Nash Bargaining Solution; Core; Veto power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 C72 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825616301075
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:100:y:2016:i:c:p:125-141

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.012

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().