Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: Existence with three players

Jan Zapal

Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 98, issue C, 235-242

Abstract: The paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a dynamic spatial legislative bargaining model. Three players bargain over one-dimensional policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a sequential protocol of proposal-making and voting, with random proposer recognitions and a simple majority, produces a policy that becomes the next period's status-quo. An equilibrium exists for any profile of proposer recognition probabilities, any profile of players' ideal policies, and any discount factor. In equilibrium, policies converge to the median's ideal policy, players moderate and propose policies close to the median's ideal in an attempt to constraint future proposers, but the tendency to moderate is a strategic substitute as the opponent of a moderating player does not moderate.

Keywords: Dynamic decision-making; Endogenous status-quo; Spatial bargaining; Legislative bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C78 D74 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:98:y:2016:i:c:p:235-242

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.013

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