Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games

Elnaz Bajoori, János Flesch and Dries Vermeulen

Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 98, issue C, 78-109

Abstract: We develop the notion of perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium—perfect BNE—in general Bayesian games. We test perfect BNE against the criteria laid out by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). We show that, for a focal class of Bayesian games, perfect BNE exists. Moreover, when payoffs are continuous, perfect BNE is limit undominated for almost every type.

Keywords: Trembling hand perfect equilibrium; Bayesian game with infinite type spaces; Behavior strategy; Second-price auction with incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Behavioral Perfect Equilibrium in Bayesian Games (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:98:y:2016:i:c:p:78-109

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.002

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