Procrastination in teams and contract design

Philipp Weinschenk

Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 98, issue C, 264-283

Abstract: We study a dynamic model of team production with moral hazard. We show that players might procrastinate to exploit the future externalities of team production. Contract design is shown to be a powerful tool to mitigate the problem of procrastination and enhance efficiency. The team's ability to write discriminatory contracts is therefore central. We also show that deadlines are not beneficial for a team, provided that players can choose efforts frequently and design contracts optimally.

Keywords: Moral hazard; Team production; Partnerships; Procrastination; Contract design; Discrimination; Deadlines (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J71 L22 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:98:y:2016:i:c:p:264-283

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.014

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