On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information

Ulrich Berger and Ansgar Grüne

Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 98, issue C, 19-33

Abstract: Indirect reciprocity describes a class of reputation-based mechanisms which may explain the prevalence of cooperation in large groups where partners meet only once. The first model for which this has been demonstrated was the image scoring mechanism. But analytical work on the simplest possible case, the binary scoring model, has shown that even small errors in implementation destabilize any cooperative regime. It has thus been claimed that for indirect reciprocity to stabilize cooperation, assessments of reputation must be based on higher-order information. Is indirect reciprocity relying on first-order information doomed to fail? We use a simple analytical model of image scoring to show that this need not be the case. Indeed, in the general image scoring model the introduction of implementation errors has just the opposite effect as in the binary scoring model: it may stabilize instead of destabilize cooperation.

Keywords: Cooperation; Prisoner's dilemma; Donation game; Indirect reciprocity; Image scoring; First-order assessment; First-order information; Evolutionary stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:98:y:2016:i:c:p:19-33

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.003

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