On equilibria in games with imperfect recall

Nicolas Lambert, Adrian Marple and Yoav Shoham

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 113, issue C, 164-185

Abstract: We generalize the modified multiselves approach of Piccione and Rubinstein to (multiplayer) games of imperfect recall. Four solution concepts are introduced: the multiselves agent equilibrium, the multiselves Nash equilibrium, the multiselves sequential equilibrium, and the multiselves perfect equilibrium. These modified equilibrium notions satisfy two important properties not fulfilled by the original ones. First, they always exist: every finite extensive game has at least one multiselves equilibrium of each type. Second, they form a strict hierarchy: every multiselves perfect equilibrium is a multiselves sequential equilibrium, every multiselves sequential equilibrium is a multiselves Nash equilibrium, and every multiselves Nash equilibrium is a multiselves agent equilibrium—but not conversely. Finally, in games of perfect recall, the multiselves equilibrium notions reduce to their original counterparts.

Keywords: Imperfect recall; Multiselves; Absentminded driver; Bounded rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:164-185

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.007

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