Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response
Andreas Blume,
Ernest K. Lai and
Wooyoung Lim
Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 113, issue C, 356-380
Abstract:
Theory suggests that garbling may improve the transmission of private information. A simple garbling procedure, randomized response, has shown promise in the field. We provide the first complete analysis of randomized response as a game and implement it as an experiment. We find in our experiment that randomized response increases truth-telling and, importantly, does so in instances where being truthful adversely affects posterior beliefs. Our theoretical analysis also reveals, however, that randomized response has a plethora of equilibria in addition to truth-telling equilibria. Lab behavior is most consistent with those informative but not truth-telling equilibria.
Keywords: Communication; Garbling; Information transmission; Randomized response; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response (2014) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:356-380
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.012
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