Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response

Andreas Blume, Ernest K. Lai and Wooyoung Lim
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Ernest K. Lai: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 490, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: The paper formalizes Warner's (1965) randomized response technique (RRT) as a game and implements it experimentally, thus linking game theoretic approaches to randomness in communication with survey practice in the field and a novel implementation in the lab. As predicted by our model and in line with Warner, the frequency of truthful responses is significantly higher with randomization than without. The model predicts that randomization weakly improves information elicitation, as measured in terms of mutual information, although, surprisingly, not always by RRT inducing truth-telling. Contrary to this prediction, randomization significantly reduces the elicited information in our experiment.

Keywords: Laboratory Experiments; Mutual Information; Stigmatization Aversion; Randomized Response; Lying Aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54
Date: 2014-05-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-for and nep-gth
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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2675241/2901859 First Version, 2013 (application/x-download)

Related works:
Journal Article: Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:490

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