Citizens or lobbies: Who controls policy?

Paolo Roberti ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 113, issue C, 497-514

Abstract: This paper analyzes a model of electoral competition with uncertainty on the policy implemented by candidates. I show that this uncertainty can induce risk-averse voters to elect politicians whose policies are biased. I apply these results to a lobbying game, where candidates hold private information about their willingness to pander to lobbies once elected. I show that voters elect politicians who implement policies biased in favor of the lobby. Increasing the probability of non-pandering candidates can increase the effect of lobbying. The model thus demonstrates that uncertainty on the influence of special interests can lead to large effects of lobbying on policy.

Keywords: Voting; Lobbying; Citizen-candidate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy? (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:497-514

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.009

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