The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting

Rebecca Morton, Marco Piovesan and Jean-Robert Tyran

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 113, issue C, 461-481

Abstract: We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a “dark side,” that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters is biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not sufficiently de-bias voters.

Keywords: Voting; Information aggregation; Cognitive biases; Wisdom of crowds; Social information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D02 D03 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting (2013)
Working Paper: The Dark Side of the Vote: Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting (2012)
Working Paper: The Dark Side of the Vote: Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting (2012)
Working Paper: The Dark Side of the Vote - Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:461-481

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.008

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