Beyond myopic best response (in Cournot competition)

Amos Fiat, Elias Koutsoupias, Katrina Ligett, Yishay Mansour and Svetlana Olonetsky

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 113, issue C, 38-57

Abstract: The Nash equilibrium as a prediction myopically ignores the possibility that deviating from the equilibrium could lead to an avalanche of beneficial changes by other agents.

Keywords: Cournot competition; Bertrand competition; Delegation games; Dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:38-57

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.006

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