A note on “Renegotiation in repeated games” [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327–360]

Michael Günther, Christoph Kuzmics and Antoine Salomon

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 114, issue C, 318-323

Abstract: In Renegotiation in Repeated Games (1989), J. Farrell and E. Maskin present, among other results, sufficient conditions for payoffs to be “weakly renegotiation-proof”. We show that a step in the corresponding proof is not correct by giving a counterexample. We then provide a correct proof with slightly more demanding sufficient conditions.

Keywords: (Weak) renegotiation-proofness; Infinitely repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Note on Renegotiation in Repeated Games [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327 360] (2018)
Working Paper: A Note on "Renegotiation in Repeated Games" [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327–360] (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:114:y:2019:i:c:p:318-323

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.002

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