A Note on Renegotiation in Repeated Games [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327 360]

Michael Guenther (), Christoph Kuzmics and Antoine Salomon ()
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Michael Guenther: University of Bielefeld, Germany
Antoine Salomon: Universit Paris-Dauphine, France
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Michael Günther

No 2018-16, Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics

Abstract: In Renegotiation in Repeated Games [1989], J. Farell and E. Maskin present, among other results, sufficient conditions for payoffs to be weakly renegotiation-proof . We show that a step in the corresponding proof is not correct by giving a counterexample. We then provide a correct proof with slightly more demanding sufficient conditions.

Keywords: (Weak) Renegotiation-Proofness; Infinitely Repeated Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: A note on “Renegotiation in repeated games” [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327–360] (2019)
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