A Note on "Renegotiation in Repeated Games" [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327–360]

Michael Günther
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Michael Günther: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
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No 572, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: In Farrell and Maskin (1989), the authors present sufficient conditions for weakly renegotiation-proof payoffs in their Theorem 1 (p. 332). We show that a step in the proof of this theorem is not correct by giving a counterexample. Nevertheless, the sufficient conditions remain true, and we offer a correction of the proof.

Keywords: (Weak) Renegotiation-Proofness; Infinitely Repeated Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33
Date: 2017-04-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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