Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game

David Perez-Castrillo and Marilda Sotomayor ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 114, issue C, 177-192

Abstract: The multiple partners game (Sotomayor, 1992) extends the assignment game to a matching model where the agents can have several partners, up to their quota, and the utilities are additively separable. The present work fills a gap in the literature of that game by studying the effects on agents' payoffs caused by the entrance of new agents in the market under both the cooperative and the competitive approaches. The results obtained have no parallel in the one-to-one assignment game.

Keywords: Matching; Stability; Competitive equilibrium; Comparative statics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Comparative Statics in the Multiple-Partners Assignment Game (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:114:y:2019:i:c:p:177-192

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.004

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