Comparative Statics in the Multiple-Partners Assignment Game

Marilda Sotomayor () and David Pérez-Castrillo
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: David Perez-Castrillo

No 1036, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: The multiple partners game (Sotomayor, 1992) extends the assignment game to a matching model where the agents can have several partners, up to their quota, and the utilities are additively separable. The present work fills a gap in the literature of that game by studying the effects on agents' payoffs caused by the entrance of new agents in the market under both the cooperative and the competitive approaches. The results obtained have no parallel in the one-to-one assignment game.

Keywords: stability; matching; Competitive Equilibrium; comparative statics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game (2019)
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