EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The instability of matching with overconfident agents

Siqi Pan

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 113, issue C, 396-415

Abstract: Many centralized college admissions markets allocate seats to students based on their performance on a single standardized exam. The exam's measurement error can cause the exam-derived priorities to deviate from colleges' aptitude-based preferences. Previous literature proposes to combine pre-exam preference submission with a Boston algorithm (a PreExam-BOS mechanism). This paper examines the proposed mechanism in an experiment where students are not fully informed of their relative aptitudes. The results show pre-exam preference submission is distorted by overconfidence and PreExam-BOS fails to achieve stable matching with respect to aptitudes. Compared to a post-score Serial Dictatorship mechanism, which is robust to overconfidence but more prone to the exam's measurement error, PreExam-BOS creates more mismatches and a greater variance in the extent of mismatches: some students receive a large advantage while others are hurt considerably. Moreover, PreExam-BOS rewards overconfidence and punishes underconfidence. The observed overconfidence cannot be mitigated with an improved information condition.

Keywords: School choice matching; College admission; Overconfidence; Gender (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C92 I28 D91 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825618301581
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:396-415

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

 
Page updated 2019-05-11
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:396-415