Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets

Bertan Turhan

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 113, issue C, 199-208

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of partition structure of schools on students' welfare and on incentives students face under the iterative student optimal stable mechanism (I-SOSM), introduced by Manjunath and Turhan (2016), in divided school enrollment systems. I find that when school partition gets coarser students' welfare weakly increases under the I-SOSM for any number of iterations. I also show that under coarser school partitions the I-SOSM becomes weakly less manipulable for students (when iterated sufficiently many times to reach a stable assignment) according to the “as strongly manipulable as” criteria defined by Pathak and Sönmez (2013). These results suggest that when full integration is not possible keeping school partition as coarse as possible benefits students with respect to their welfare and incentives they face if stability is a concern for policymakers.

Keywords: School partitions; Divided enrollment; School choice; Fairness; Non-wastefulness; Preference manipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982561830157X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:199-208

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.015

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().