The market for talent: Competition for resources and self-governance in teams
Brock Stoddard () and
Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 114, issue C, 268-284
In a laboratory setting, we investigate the effect of competition for the resources of team members with ‘divided loyalties’, and the role of such competition in overcoming the free-rider problem associated with the provision of team-level public goods. We find that competition alone creates ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. However, if groups have access to more information on the actions of team members, or are able to determine their membership through ostracism, they are more successful in attracting the ‘loyalties’ of team members. By eschewing the study of additional mechanisms that require external intervention or alterations of payoff functions, our work highlights the potential of implicit competition in promoting cooperation.
Keywords: Public goods; Experiment; Divided loyalties; Competition; Resources; Endogenous membership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Working Paper: The Market for Talent: Competition for Resources and Self-Governance in Teams (2018)
Working Paper: The Market for Talent: Competition for Resources and Self- Governance in Teams (2018)
Working Paper: The market for talent: Competition for resources and self governance in teams (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:114:y:2019:i:c:p:268-284
Access Statistics for this article
Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai
More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().