The market for talent: Competition for resources and self governance in teams
Abhijit Ramalingam,
Brock Stoddard and
James Walker
No 16-15, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.
Abstract:
We experimentally investigate the effect of naturally occurring competition for the resources of team members with ‘divided loyalties’ on the ability of teams to overcome the free-rider problem associated with the provision of public goods. We find that such competition alone creates ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. However, if groups are able to determine their membership, they are able to attract the ‘loyalties’ of all team members. By eschewing the study of additional mechanisms that require external intervention or alterations of payoff functions, our work highlights the role played by implicit market competition and endogenous self-governance of membership in promoting cooperation.
Keywords: public goods; experiment; divided loyalties; competition; resources; endogenous membership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-10-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: The market for talent: Competition for resources and self-governance in teams (2019) 
Working Paper: The Market for Talent: Competition for Resources and Self-Governance in Teams (2018) 
Working Paper: The Market for Talent: Competition for Resources and Self- Governance in Teams (2018) 
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