Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations

Matias Nuñez and Marcus Pivato

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 113, issue C, 285-305

Abstract: We propose a new solution to the problem of strategic voting for large electorates. For any deterministic voting rule, we design a stochastic rule that asymptotically approximates it in the following sense: for a sufficiently large population of voters, the stochastic voting rule (i) incentivizes every voter to reveal her true preferences and (ii) produces the same outcome as the deterministic rule, with arbitrarily high probability. We then apply these results to obtain an implementation in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Large elections; Strategic voting; Truth-revelation; Stochastic voting rule; Bayesian Nash implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations * (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:285-305

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.009

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