Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations *

Matias Nuñez and Marcus Pivato

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Deterministic voting rules are notoriously susceptible to strategic voting. We propose a new solution to this problem for large electorates. For any deterministic voting rule, we can design a stochastic rule that asymptotically approximates it in the following sense: for a sufficiently large population of voters, the stochastic voting rule (i) incentivizes every voter to reveal her true preferences and (ii) produces the same outcome as the deterministic rule, with very high probability.

Keywords: Large Elections; Truth-telling; Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-06-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01340317v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations (2019)
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