Individual versus group choices of repeated game strategies: A strategy method approach

Timothy Cason and Vai-Lam Mui

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 114, issue C, 128-145

Abstract: We study experimentally the indefinitely repeated noisy prisoner's dilemma, in which random events can change an intended action to its opposite. We investigate whether groups choose Always Defect less and use lenient or forgiving strategies more than individuals, and how decision-makers experiment with different strategies by letting them choose from an extensive list of repeated game strategies. We find that groups use forgiving and tit-for-tat strategies more than individuals. Always Defect, however, is the most popular strategy for both groups and individuals. Groups and individuals cooperate at similar rates overall, and they seldom experiment with different strategies in later supergames.

Keywords: Laboratory experiment; Cooperation; Repeated games; Strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825619300041
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Individual versus Group Choices of Repeated Game Strategies: A Strategy Method Approach (2019)
Working Paper: Individual versus Group Choices of Repeated Game Strategies: A Strategy Method Approach (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:114:y:2019:i:c:p:128-145

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.003

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().