Individual versus Group Choices of Repeated Game Strategies: A Strategy Method Approach

Timothy Cason and Vai-Lam Mui

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study experimentally the indefinitely repeated noisy prisoner s dilemma, in which random events can change an intended action to its opposite. We investigate whether groups choose Always Defect less and use lenient or forgiving strategies more than individuals,and how decision-makers experiment with different strategies by letting them choose from an extensive list of repeated game strategies. We find that groups use forgiving and tit-for-tat strategies more than individuals. Always Defect, however, is the most popular strategy for both groups and individuals. Groups and individuals cooperate at similar rates overall, and they seldom experiment with different strategies in later supergames. Classification-JEL C73, C92

Keywords: Laboratory experiments; Cooperation; Repeated Games; Strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2018-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Individual versus group choices of repeated game strategies: A strategy method approach (2019)
Working Paper: Individual versus Group Choices of Repeated Game Strategies: A Strategy Method Approach (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1312

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