Individual versus Group Choices of Repeated Game Strategies: A Strategy Method Approach
Timothy Cason () and
Vai-Lam Mui ()
No 01-19, Monash Economics Working Papers from Monash University, Department of Economics
We study experimentally the indefinitely repeated noisy prisonerâ€™s dilemma, in which random events can change an intended action to its opposite. We investigate whether groups choose Always Defect less and use lenient or forgiving strategies more than individuals, and how decision-makers experiment with different strategies by letting them choose from an extensive list of repeated game strategies. We find that groups use forgiving and tit-for-tat strategies more than individuals. Always Defect, however, is the most popular strategy for both groups and individuals. Groups and individuals cooperate at similar rates overall, and they seldom experiment with different strategies in later supergames.
Keywords: Laboratory Experiment; Cooperation; Repeated Games; Strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Individual versus group choices of repeated game strategies: A strategy method approach (2019)
Working Paper: Individual versus Group Choices of Repeated Game Strategies: A Strategy Method Approach (2018)
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