Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities

Yusuke Iwase (), Shoya Tsuruta and Akina Yoshimura

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 132, issue C, 368-379

Abstract: We consider a school choice problem under general priorities with ties. Priorities in practice are usually complex since a school may rank students equally or care about an affirmative action policy. Thus, we do not specify a class of priorities already known, but abstractly treat all priorities such that a stable matching exists for all students' preference profiles. For those priorities, it is unknown whether stable matchings are achievable when students are strategic. We show that a stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibria. Then, we focus on the Pareto-frontier of stable matchings, which we call constrained efficient stable. We show that, under a reasonable class of priorities, a constrained efficient stable correspondence is Nash implementable if and only if it satisfies Maskin monotonicity. Finally, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition on priorities under which a constrained efficient stable correspondence is Nash implementable.

Keywords: Nash implementation; Stability; Constrained efficient stability; Acyclicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D63 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:132:y:2022:i:c:p:368-379

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.012

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