Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation

Armando Gomes

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 132, issue C, 463-477

Abstract: We propose a new solution for coalition bargaining problems among n players that can form coalitions c generating heterogenous coalitional values ▪. The players' values vi and probability of coalition formation ▪ are given by: where coalition c is chosen only if it maximizes the average gain ▪ and ▪. This solution is the strong Markov perfect equilibrium of a non-cooperative coalition bargaining game where players choose simultaneously the coalition they want to join followed by negotiations to split the surplus. The solution does not rely on the specification of a proposer recognition protocol. For majority voting games, the solution exhibits more inequality among the values of large and small parties and a concentrated equilibrium coalition formation distribution.

Keywords: Coalitional bargaining; Voting games; Multilateral negotiations; Stochastic and dynamic games; Bargaining theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C73 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825622000161
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:132:y:2022:i:c:p:463-477

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.010

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().