Informational robustness of common belief in rationality

Gabriel Ziegler

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 132, issue C, 592-597

Abstract: In this note, I explore the implications of informational robustness under the assumption of common belief in rationality. That is, predictions for incomplete-information games which are valid across all possible information structures. First, I address this question from a global perspective and then generalize the analysis to allow for localized informational robustness.

Keywords: Informational robustness; Rationalizability; Incomplete information; Bayesian game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:132:y:2022:i:c:p:592-597

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.025

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